“The “SOMALILAND” MYTHOLOGY INDICTED

Calling the Spade a Spade
Pat I: The Charges
By: Abdalla A. Hirad

“Thus, the attitude to Somaliland’s independence, of those southern Somali politicians who oppose it, is akin to that of a person who has had a limb amputated, but still claims to feel it as part of his body.” I. M. Lewis

A foreword:

  I start this essay by thanking the two respondents to my earlier essay[i]” ” Somaliland”: Haunted by Its Founding Mythology”,  carried in Hiiraan news.com and wardheerNews.com, as well as many other websites. The two respondents are Ahmed Aideed[ii], for his  “ A Rejoinder to A. Hirad …”carried in Hiiraan news.com as well as wardheerNews.com, and Ahmed I. Hassan[iii] for his ”Hirad on Somaliland …”, carried in WardheerNews.com. I thank both of them for their time and effort to read and respond to my paper. It has been quite a pleasure that they have afforded me the opportunity to revisit the subject of discussion—namely, “Somaliland”—and, once again, discuss some questions they raise about my paper as well as some which I had missed to bring up earlier but which are relevant to the subject of discussion,. 

As I said elsewhere, “…In Response to Critics and Fault-Finders”, posted in wardheerNews.com on Sunday, April 23. 2006,  I  pray that  my people everywhere will give me the benefit of the doubt that I am presenting this argument honestly, objectively and constructively to the best of my ability. I also pray that the issues raised herein, will, in a small way, positively augment the intensity of the ongoing dialogue on unity and the restoration of our State—which will never be complete without the participation of “Somaliland” and its people.

I assure my people in “Somaliland” that I do not harbor any contempt or ill-will towards them, in their clannish grouping or in any other social denominations. I apologize in advance should they ever feel that I write anything about them in contempt or ill-well. All should, further, note that my critiques are targeted at the leadership in Hargeisa and on foreign organizations, governments if any, and individuals of status collaborating with them towards the dismemberment of the Somali Republic.

Now that the “Somalilanders” have come out of the closet to engage in a meaningful debate, such as we have, I have noted they have been invariably paraphrasing the words of the secession guru[iv], Professor, I. M. Lewis. In this spirit, and in conjunction with the above words of caution, I must not pass without making a simple remark on the above statement by Professor I. M Lewis, and I say to him: Indeed, unlike you, Professor, we would all feel the phantom pains you speak of, on both sides, if we were to be dismembered as is your intention—God forbid.

On Professor Jhazbhay:

 Before I move on to the discussion of more serious issues, I must remove out of the way, some remarks made by the two respondents on my response to Professor Jhazbhay. For example, Aideed writes that I “tried to throw personal aspersions” at Professor Jhazbhay. The Professor, I believe, has thrown my critique on himself, if that is what Mr. Aideed calls “aspersions”, which I consider a gross mischaracterization of my words. It is a known fact that the Professor is on contract with the leadership in Hargeisa. I do not know whether that is gratuitous on his part or that his services are for a pay. I also know that, under such a contract, he has been providing services including that of “business caretaker”, as well as that of a lobbyist for the leadership, within South Africa.

 Many nationals of host countries exactly perform similar functions—particularly as care takers of business for foreign governments within their countries, in accordance with some protocols of international relations—in many countries all over the world. But Mr. Jhazbhay has exposed himself to the wrath of many Somalis, including myself, as he overstepped his role, whatever that is—for all practical purposes—to become, a publicity monger for a lost cause, and an extremely unpopular one, the dismemberment of Somalia—a  sister African country of South Africa. He has been meddling with the internal affairs of the nation (Somalia) part of which he claims to represent—and one which is marred by conflict and controversy within itself. By doing that he has, in essence, indicted himself. A well as being an unprecedented diplomatic dishonor for himself, which he brought on himself, it could ultimately be considered a transgression of the protocols of international relations

Mr. Aideed’s slanderous statement about my person is cast in random, as one does with a fishing rod. Good luck with his fishing, I should say! I shall be acquitted of those charges—I am sure—as soon as he comes to see the better of my message. In the words of the famous American, “Dream Team” lawyer, the Late Mr. Johnny Cochran, “If it does not fit you must acquit”, I beg of Mr. Aideed. On a rather light hearted note, I must assure my fellow countryman that I will not be as strong on him as he thought I was on Professor Jhazbhay. To Ahmed Hassan I have one correction to make. “Africa’s Best Kept Secret” was coined by Nuruddin Farah as Professor Jhazbhay[v] , himself, correctly quotes him in the first sentence of his promotion stunt. I had already forwarded my impressions on this issue, in the paper to which Ahmed Hassan did duly respond. Here are Professor Jhazbhay’s words; Should Mr. Hassan wishes to correct himself, or, for whatever devil may care! The Professor quotes the writer as follows: “Africa‘s Best-Kept Secret.” Writes one of the Horn’s most famous sons, Nuruddin Farah, in ‘Secrets’:

   On remises in my earlier essay

Mighty grateful to God, and for Mr. Aideed as well as Mr. Hassan, for the opportunity afforded to me to consolidate my argument in the rest of this paper, and while speaking about a matter relating to  South Africa, I thank God that I am able to attend to one remiss in my previous essay. I have since obtained the name of the former Foreign Minister of South Africa, H.E., the Late Mr. David Enzo, who I wrote we had the pleasure to meet with, at the UN Delegates Launch, during one of the General assembly Sessions, in the mid nineties—probably that of 1994—hoping that my memory is not failing me in this regard. I regret I was not as thorough in remembering his name, in as much as I have been clinging to the event in my memory. I have since been told that, sadly, he passed away in 1999 because of natural causes. My condolences go to his family and to the people and government of South Africa.

I regret also that I had erroneously, twice, repeated the mistake that it has been more than fifty years since independence, as has been pointed out to me by one of the readers of my article. Thanks to him, I now realized that it has been only 46 years since. Thanks again to the same reader who took me to task on the omission of the Minister’s name, which I now found and cited above. Gladly, we should all feel four years younger, at a minimum, because of the reader’s watchfulness of the years, as counted in the wrong Hirad’s calendar, to intimate a light hearted remark here. If you don’t mind, that is. Pray with me that we all will celebrate a vibrant, united Somalia by the 5oth anniversary of its Independence and union, which will be only 4 years from now, God willing. Amen.

On the decision to secede

Ever since the inception of the elite-driven fabrication of the “Somaliland Republic”, the World wondered why was it conceived? Why? Why separate from the motherland during this era of globalization ,when the odds that any nation with a population short of a hundred million—according to some theorists—is likely to be absorbed by a larger one? Why the secession?

No matter how many times you ask the same question of those promoting “Somaliland”, the answer has invariably been the same: because the people participating in the Burao Conference of the Northern Communities of Somalia, in May, 1991, demanded it! Now, that is either one heck of sophistry or a gross disrespect for the intelligence of the enquirer.

Beyond that, the details have been retribution related—that the people of the North had suffered the injustices of the South of Somalia under Barre’s regime. And even, there have been less intelligible explanations about clan hegemony by the so-called “South”. By God, this is true, in as far as Barre’s regime set one clan against another to divide and rule. But one would like to think that the Somali National Movement (SNM) was created to free the nation from that regime to avoid a more catastrophic eventuality. It is hardly the justification or the raison d’être one would expect to hear for a decision as drastic as the decision to secede—by the leadership of  “Somaliland”—to separate from the  mother State and going it alone.

Once, in mid 1990, I put a proposition to the test—out of curiosity—with one, significantly informed, opinion leader, at the time, in the camp of the SNM supporters. Gladly, my friend, is now a member of the Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia, or at least has been until recently. I had challenged him that the SNM may have had confused the Issac clan with the people of the North; confused “Daroodism” (Barre’s clan), as the opposition used to label Barre regime’s policies, with nationalism; and confused the destiny of the state with the of Barre’s regime. He looked up at me and said: “there was no confusion between terms. We had considered all three dualisms rationally and consciously and decided to proceed as observed.” 

I had taken the assertion with a pinch of salt. For, certainly, the Berbera 10-point plan of February 1991—which preceded the Burao one, of May 1991, in which the secession was declared—had neither proclaimed, nor had in any way indicated, any reason to predict—at least formally—such intent was in the horizon, immediately, that is. The ten-point plan had proclaimed the establishment of a regional administration over the next two years within which, among other things, complete reconciliation between the communities in the north would be attained, and, dialogue and discussions would be conducted on the question of the secession. Needless to mention that, 3 months later, in May of 1991, the decision[vi] to secede was taken at the spur of the moment, and in the presence of an armed, guns-rattling SNM militia, to plunder the agenda under a shroud of mob-style, intimidating psychology. That has been reported by some of those non-SNM participants of the meeting. To claim that the people desired it this way is a gross misrepresentation of the facts, only to conceal the truth.

Nor was the decision to secede, at any time, a stated goal of the leadership of the Somali National Movement (SNM), the faction which, later, claimed the fruits of the secession. That is true in as far as one can tell, judging by a paper produced by Mr. Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud (Siilaanyo[vii]), the then outgoing chairman of the SNM, who was replaced a few months before the collapse of the then Somali government, in January 1991. Faisal Roble[viii] in his feature article posted in WardheerNews.com, “A Nation without Elite based Movement,” writes: 

“Silanyo drafted a paper right after the SNM took over the northern region of Somalia. He called it “A Proposal for Establishing a Transitional National Government,” and circulated it among some Somali circles. Except some political miscalculations, Silanyo’s proposal had relatively more of an intellectual national vision; he at least called for the establishments of a caretaker transitional government (established by SNM in the North and USC in the South) that would have collectively united and led the country for a transitional period of not more than one-five-year term.” 

So much for the often repeated self assertion, by the supporters of the “Somaliland” edifice, that the secession was an a priori goal of the SNM, or that it was not possible at all, that the people of the region would or could reconcile with their brethren in the rest of Somalia—an idea which was never put to the test in earnest, despite the earlier proclamation of the earlier Conference. Later, the best rationalization and articulation of this impulsive decision, after the fact, has come from a foreigner. For instance, Professor I. M. Lewis[ix] writes, in defense of the session:

“The reality is, of course, that the former union with ex-Italian Somalia has fallen apart in response to the atrocities inflicted by the Siyad regime on the civilian population of Somaliland. Independence has been regained by the SNM freedom fighters. Surely it would be racist to claim that this was not a legitimate liberation struggle on the grounds that the southern Somali oppressors were not white-skinned. It is also worth pointing out, that to call Somaliland ‘self-declared’, as its detractors do, is unwittingly to compliment Somaliland’s democracy. Sadly there are currently no comparable democratically elected bodies in Somalia which could express a convincingly concerted opinion on the issue.”

To illustrate how passionate can “Somalilanders” be about the issue, as a consequence, let us visit what Hassan[x], a respondent to my paper[xi], ““Somaliland”: Haunted by Its Founding Mythology”, in WardheerNews.com, writes. Hassan vouches that “regardless of recognition or no recognition, the more primary and important preoccupation is one of principle. It is the re-affirmation and defense of Somaliland’s independence. This independence is final, irrevocable and non-negotiable.” That sounds invitation for trouble, to put it mildly, if it were to be considered—that is—the official, rational policy of the leadership of “Somaliland”. And one does hear—from time to time—such rhetoric from the highest ranks in the leadership. Many Somalis do still doubt it and do not take them seriously, thinking that it is just pure polemics. Where it gets confusing for the  masses supporting the session, and perhaps even the leadership, is when even the greatest lobbyist for the lost cause, Professor I. M. Lewis[xii], implies differently, as he reports that the “… British further argue that Somaliland must negotiate with Somalia and if agreement is reached on independence, then they and presumably other EU states, would follow suit. This is tantamount to arguing that an abused wife should seek her husband’s blessing before setting up on her own.”

But Professor Lewis, sometimes, sounds more passionate than his Somali counterparts in his campaign on their behalf. You would think it is more than just out of a platonic love with “Somaliland”. However, by citing the abused wife analogy, above, he is so contemptuous and subliminally disdainful to the faith of the same people whose rights he is supposed to be defending, In Islam, the power is vested in the male partner to release the wife or to keep her, simplistically put, although the process is more complex than that. I wondered why the Professor uttered those words, at all.” It is more than random coincidence that I found the following statement by professor Samatar, a while after I committed my last sentence to paper. Professor Samatar makes a similar observation. In relation to a specific written rambling, in my view, by Professor Lewis, about the Somali social phenomena, Samatar writes:

“On the surface, this assertion conveys the impression of a scholar protective of the autonomy of people he cares about. Moreover, there is always the present danger of a perspective hatched in one cultural time imperiously landing on a different other. On this account the indictment is noted. But there is another, perhaps even more pernicious approach—that is, one that at once denies Somalis access to the experience and wisdom of the rest of the human race and there freezes Somalia into an exotic reality available only from the insights of a self-chosen guru”.

 

On terms and concepts—semantics aside

Although there were many precursor signs to the onslaught of the process of disintegration of Somalia—still—continuing—the social contract was intact, for all practical purposes, and there was the hope that the government could be replaced and everything else would go as usual. Indeed, it was not until the SNM breached the contract, first, in May of 1992 that hopes for government resuscitation began to plummet for all. Whether Hobbes-ian (Hobbes’ theory) or not, which Aideed tends to advance, I used the phraseology of “state of nature” for simplicity, to characterize the state of affairs in the country after and since the collapse of government, when the State fell apart into its composite clans. I have not used the phraseology loosely and my characterization is very well intended in this regard. I purposefully refer to John Locke’s[xiii] theory on what he calls “on the dissolution of government” which I also used elsewhere. I use that phraseology for a more practical reason too.  He argues: “ …Whereby this union is dissolved … in that case (not being able to maintain and support themselves as one entire and independent body) the union belonging to that body which consisted therein must necessarily cease, and so everyone returns to the state he was in before …”.

I also used the phrase in response to the use of the term “reconfiguration” which is also a term used by the British Foreign Office, according to Lewis[xiv]. He writes: “Somali ‘reconfiguration’ as the British Foreign Office blandly calls it, has already happened.” That same term had been used by John Locke, speaking about the ‘reconfiguration of entities’ to imply new shifts in the reconstruction of the civil society, including, each entity “shifting for itself as they fit”—and that is dangerous. So it was not as if used the theory by mistake earlier for Aideed to put Hobbes in fingers, that is.

Pursuant to this theory, my argument has been that “Somaliland” can neither be characterized as a State of its own right, which the paper will prove in its Part II; nor can it be accepted as a single clan territory to which all and everybody who returned to it are from the same single clan. Therefore, obviously, it does not deserve the description of the “state of nature in which they were before”, as theorized above by John Locke. Yes, all returned to the state they were in before within the region—but each to their clan territories, that is—but not to a “Somaliland”, as Mr. Aideed and company tend to advance. It is a territory shared by a number of clans, which the SNM leadership has been trying to bulldoze together, like the British before them, by having intimidated the representative delegations at the Burao Conference, of 1991. In fact they masterminded the Conference, and its aftermath, so well as to make the world almost believe that the clans chose to unite under the Banner of “Somaliland”, and, secede. How simple and sweet?  Or, did they?

Aideed’s assertion that “the Somalis are historically known as extremely independent people who had elaborate clan systems that ensured social harmony” has been but a  fantasy—a sense of false pride, at best—and it does not make me any less Somali to be realistic about it. That I called “territoriality”, for me, relates to an unpublished work, as yet and it is—the subject of a paper[xv], which I had presented elsewhere. He continues “They may have lacked a centralized authority as did many other social groupings but they were far from what Hobbes referred to as ‘state of nature’.”

But that is the point—never mind the Hobbes word— which Aideed ought to realize; that without a central authority one exists in a “state of nature”—one, that is, based on kin and kith relations rather than agreements translated into formal bonds of law. Here, “Somaliland”, it seems cannot wish away the motto that many communities in the region would rather stay in their “state of nature” than share a central authority with the existing “Somaliland”. But, just in case one might wish to reconsider his/her position on the matter, I shall draw on the view of a famous mentor the great guru of his, in terms of seeking the secession. Here, I found a very striking difference between Aideed’s thesis on the subject of “clans” and that of Professor I. M Lewis[xvi]. The Professor looks down on the traditional Somali social order and reeks of contempt meshed together with the paradoxical element, typical of Samatar’s observation above, for the Somali clans—as Lewis argues his case, seemingly with the International community—by writing the following::

“It is not simply that Somali traditional society is atomized and only waiting to be brought together by the benign civil society engineer. Nothing could be further from the case. Traditional Somali society is compartmentalized into a myriad of small extended family units which tend by nature to be mutually hostile. True, these units routinely combine and dissolve in wider temporary groupings which eventually reach the level of the ‘clan’, itself an intrinsically unstable unit. But to perform the miracle of bringing these naturally opposed polities together in a wider and more stable framework requires a constantly expanding recognition”

On Sophistry and False Hopes

What a contradiction! The above statement, not only contradicts Mr. Aideed’s assumptions, but it also involves an oxymoron of grave proportions. Alas! It seems that on the one hand, the Professor is making a case for “Somaliland’s” success as a cohesive polity, while, on the other he argues above that ”the miracle of bringing these naturally opposed polities together in a wider and more stable framework requires a constantly expanding recognition”. It seems, therefore, the professor has refuted his own theory. What is good by Peter is not good by Tom—what is good by “Somaliland” is not good by the Somali Republic, he sounds to say. Whatever the theory, the purpose of such a consequentially myopic and disastrous exercise—seeking to secede—has never been clear to me. In my opinion, it may have, initially, had to do with an intention of the SNM leadership of that day demarcating their claimed territory of control for a future power play with other political entities in the country, or in a contention between themselves, within the North itself—an effort which must have backfired by now for all intents and purposes. Hence, a sophistry, at best—a mythology!

It has been the case that both the previous two leaders of “Somaliland”, the Late Mr. Abdurrahman A. Ali and the Late Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, as well as the current incumbent, Mr. Dahir Rayaale Kaahin, have been accused, by the opposition—of  a hidden conspiracy to lead otherwise—towards what they call a “reunion with Somalia”. And that is where the vessel had leaked for the SNM—by accusing each other of the ultimate crime, so that the late Mr. Egal, the political wizard he was, had exploited the situation, as a savior and a candid alternative, making the SNM hit bottom hard. He too had not escaped the allegations of what is equivalent to high treason in their myopic world. But he had to be laboring very hard to come up with a way to back out of the dead end until the day he died, if the popular rumors were indeed true—that he had a solid intention to reverse course. God bless his soul.

Actuality, the leadership seems to have hit a dead end, in a situation where they have had no position to fall back to, or a face-saving formula to escape embarrassment, typical of all compulsive decisions, such as was the decision to secede. After all, many of the SNM leaders in the early days of the claimed secession have returned to uphold the unity of the Somali nation since—including, that is, the late Abdurrahman Ahmed Ali (Tur)—the first President of “Somaliland”, who was later championing for unity, until his recent death. God bless his soul! Osman Jama Ali, Jama Mohamed Ghalib Mohamoud Jama Abdullahi (Sifir) and Ismail Hurre (Buuba[xvii]) are some of the others, to name a few.  

Generally speaking, the declaration of the secession has been a multi-headed monster, independent of the wishes and control of a, conservatively, good proportion of the people of the North. Unfortunately, the situation continues unabated and remains to present an up-close and present danger for all. Unable to consider options or discuss challenges and opportunities for the future among themselves, all have had to remain solemn to their safety and security as a priority, in the interim, until reality hits to dispel the fantasy. In the words of one pundit from Hargeisa, “We cannot question the situation as of the moment, in 1991, when the decision was made”—and so spontaneously—I add.

On Attained Peace and Democracy in “Somaliland”

There is no doubt in anyone’s mind that “Somaliland” fares much better than the deep “South”—that is in the area between Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo—earlier dubbed the “death Triangle”. But it has not been faring any better than the Central regions and “Puntland. So, despite the peace and stability often claimed—and obsessively repeated by those wedded to the notion of “Somaliland”—the situation has remained amber-like underneath the ashes, waiting to flare up with the slightest touch of straw on a windy day—God forbid. Surely you will agree with me, dear “Somalilander”, that, for example, the situation has been so polarized in Burao that the kids from the east side of town hardly go and hang out with those in the west of town. One must, however, admit that the conditions have remained better in Hargeisa. In reality, and in general, one can only speak of relative peace. And it has only been as peaceful as any place northwards of Mogadishu. True though, the comparison weighs heavier towards “Somaliland” in relation to the “Death Triangle”, which has remained the bone of contention between those forces competing for national power—because of the zone’s significant economic, strategic and symbolic advantages—and therefore the object of strong and recurrent violence throughout the last 15 years.

“Somalilanders” also point out as to how democratically governed is their claimed territory, comparing it to what they consider the “South”. Probably oblivious of the fact that Somalia was a democracy for 9 years before it was overturned by an ambitious military junta, in which the North was adequately represented, for whatever it was worth—the Barre Regime, that is. At some point the only Vice President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), the Late, General Jama Ali Qorshel, was from the North. They tend to project the false image as if they (the secessionists) have first introduced democracy into the region, during the last 10 years or so, if at all. They tend to forget to remember that their brand of democracy, at least in terms of experience and memory, was conceived in Mogadishu during the era of democracy and the multi-party system of Somalia. They do not realize that the presidential system they concocted, and are wobbling with, was patched up with the old Somali Constitution by a Sudanese lawyer hired by the late Mr. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, a former Prime Minister of the Somali Republic. The people of the region—surely, you will agree with me—are, therefore, in it together for the peace and stability.

It is, however, far from the truth that the ruling elite have had anything significant to do with the peace. Nor have the people of the region, dubbed “Somaliland” shared government. That is because the leadership in Hargeisa has never given a sense of belonging to all. In fact, the people have become wiser of the political games of the elite and weary of the consequences of sectarian violence that there has been enough war-fatigue to bring about the prevailing lull. I call it lull, because the winds of war hover in the horizon—God forbid—as a long as the secession remains the policy of the leadership in Hargeisa.

Speaking of grassroots, the Borama piece talks which has been hailed as the genesis of peace and stability, and they claim attended by all communities, had actually nothing to do with grassroots. It had to do more with the differences of the political elite—especially in the lack of a winner in the preceding war for BERBERA in 1992.  Hence, they opted to convene a Conference of the elite of the clans to settle their differences and to hopefully peacefully divide the bounty of governmental posts between themselves. Imagine the Republican and Democratic parties of the US, for example, or the three major parties of the UK holding joint conventions to settle difference and to share power. No such meeting can be called “grassroots” endeavors.   In earnest, those meetings have been devoid of public participation.

One good piece of evidence that there was no serious undertaking, regarding the encouragement of grassroots efforts, was that the initiative was initially conceived in such a way that there would be, at least, two meetings—one in the west of the region, to be held in the town of Borama as a venue, the other was to take place in Erigavo, in the east. No sooner than the elite could get what they wanted out of the Borama meeting—re-imposing a government from the top on the region—than they forgot about the next meeting in Erigavo. They would not undertake it as planned, simply, because it was never about communities or grassroots, for that matter, in the first place. Consequently, the tension in the Sanaag region of those days lingered on for a while until the communities tackled them on their own, with God’s help.

The history of those series of real meetings of the Sanaag and Sool regions predated the Borama but had collapsed after the onslaught of the government from the top, following the Borama Meeting, of the summer of 1993. Those meetings symbolized a good example of grassroots reconciliation talks for building and maintaining peace. Actually those talks tickled on and were successful only because they were held in the hinterland far out of the reach of the elite in Hargeisa, Burao or even Erigavo. The elite can never go so far, as to work in places with no glamour and decadent life. Even Erigavo and Borama are considered as picnic camps to enjoy visiting for a few days but not likely places to live in for longer, by the elite. I am sure you will agree with me, at least on this score dear reader. Alas! Not many can associate the elite factor with the ensuing war over the Hargeisa airport which restarted within a year-and-a-half after the hailed Borama Meeting

On the question of democracy, here too, we encounter elite gimmicks in the name of democracy and grassroots. Those who promote the edifice of “Somaliland” might count their blessings for the perceived success, on this score. But, they do not realize the cost in time, effort and resources committed to baby-sit the political elite and to pay them to behave well, even by their own standards. This, in itself, accounts for big expenses and opportunities lost for the people of the region, including those of Hargeisa. The costs in the misuse of resources, the corruption and the falsely raised hopes of the people—that they will be recognized for a separate State—are all opportunities foregone for the masses in terms of provisions for social services, i.e. education, health, employment etc. The result cannot account for what it takes to maintain the expenses of the false image which the elite likes to project through the good office of the likes of “his Excellency” Professor Iqbal Daood Jhazbhay, Ambassador of “Somaliland” to South Africa!

For more on the subject of the elite, you can please visit my article[xviii] “The TFG and the Politics of Disintegration in the Post Embagathi Somalia”, posted in WardheerNews.com, on March 19, 2006. What the elite has in Hargeisa, and only in Hargeisa is called pseudo-democracy—democracy in name only—NOT democracy. No doubt, we all must accept this as a modicum of positive experience towards a better future, which can be recognized as a symbol of the potential of Somalia to come back from its political abyss, and non more for now. But we should all try and dispel the clan centric-notion—which “Somalilanders” tend to promote—that it could only happen in  their and only, in their region. Indeed, it can happen anywhere in the Somali Republic.

On the subject of elections and the building of new institutions which are cited as successes, while can be fundamentally disputed in terms of structure, process and effectiveness, it is not the focus of discussion here.  It has not, therefore, been as compact as one might call it a “social contract”. Let us for a moment consider Professor Samatar’s observation of the reality in as far as elections are concerned. Professor Samatar [xix]observes:

“To the contrary, there was hardly any time and room for debate. More to the point the process was intimidating and hurriedly arranged to the extent that a large and politically significant zone of the population (particularly in the east) refused to participate in both the referendum and the 2003 “presidential election”.

 It still remains a fluid situation, marred by many lurking political disasters—which the people resignedly accept in the interest of peace. They are therefore, hostages to the peace the dividends of which they ought to enjoy. It is peace, yes, but one which they are constantly tortured for in their fear to lose. If, however, the peace were truly built on the informal TRADITIONAL mechanisms of the North, as the promoters of “Somaliland” tend to advance, then those mechanisms are not unique to the region and, indeed, prevail in all the Somali territories including Kililka-5, Djibouti and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. Therefore, it is not true that those mechanisms do not exist in what some call the “South”. Even then, in the “South”, the violence lingers on in around the major population centers and in the “death triangle”, which has exceptional circumstances prevailing. That too requires the attention of the people of the northern region to help resolve to ensure complete reconciliation in Somalia. It takes the whole of Somalia for the people of the North to make it one way or the other. 

Dear Reader, Stay tuned for Part II, which including other topics, discusses the “Act of Union”,  the continuity of the Somali Republic despite the collapse of government, the illegal nature of the argument for the existence for “Somaliland” and, therefore, the political and economic and political argument for unity of both the North and South.

God bless you all! Abdalla A. Hirad
MHirad@aol.com 

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