Mogadishu residents at a rally called by the Union of Islamic Courts. |
NAIROBI, 6 Jul 2006 (IRIN) – The takeover of Mogadishu on 4 June by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was the most important political event in Somalia in the last 16 years. It removed a political class of clan-based extortionists and dealers in everything from drugs to people, known as ‘warlords’, which has divided and ruled the country since the collapse of the central state in 1991.
Warlordism created one of the world’s most protracted humanitarian crises. In the absence of any significant political, military or humanitarian intervention, Somalia has suffered chronic impoverishment, exodus, displacement and international isolation.
However, the recent military victory by UIC, triggered by popular revolt against the warlords, achieved what international military intervention and peace talks have failed to accomplish since 1991. Unable to neutralise or control the warlords, the international community ultimately resorted to working with them. Fifteen rounds of internationally sponsored peace talks, held externally, in 2004 resulted in the establishment of the present Transitional Federal Government (TFG), headed by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, a former army colonel.
Fall said he had talked to the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Court by telephone. “I informed him of my willingness to meet with him on behalf of the United Nations to discuss a peaceful way forward … He told me he would be ready to meet with me at any mutually convenient date.”
Background
The warlords
Abdullahi Yusuf belongs to the original ‘warlord’ class, which was instrumental in the destruction of the central state. It was led by experienced military leaders and activists who mobilised the loyalty of clan-based militia and former soldiers against Muhammed Siyad Barre’s collapsing dictatorship – or against each other. But it was a political class that failed to offer a uniting political ideology or agenda. The warlords resorted to carving out clan-based fiefdoms and brokered power through brutality, extortion and destruction. Having removed Barre, they proceeded to divide and ruin Mogadishu, and displaced hundreds of thousands of people as they seized fertile lands, demolished infrastructure and pursued ephemeral alliances.
General Muhammad Farah Aideed was the best known of this group. He was arrested, along with Abdullahi Yusuf, immediately after Barre came to power in 1969; but both were appointed to senior positions later. In 1978, Abdullahi Yusuf led a failed coup and went into exile in Ethiopia. Aideed’s last official post was as ambassador to India, to which he defected in 1998 to lead the United Somali Congress (USC), which led the attack on Mogadishu. Other significant warlords at this time were Colonel Omar Jess, who operated variously from the northwest, Kismayo, and the Ethiopian Ogaden; and General Muhammad Said Hirsi Morgan, Barre’s former minister of defence.
In the late 1990s, a new group dominated Mogadishu. They bought themselves territory and militia loyalty, and made the capital ungovernable until their defeat on 4 June.
This group of warlords typically had little professional military or political experience. They financed their fiefdoms by dealing in weapons and drugs, and extortion and illegal licensing. Taking advantage of Somalia’s isolation and lack of governance, they directly or indirectly profited from illegal international contracts, including fishing rights, charcoal trade and the trafficking of weapons, people and drugs. Road-blocks in and around Mogadishu were erected for the sole purpose of extortion and intimidation. Unlike Somalia’s traditional warlord class, these faction leaders were not the product of the battle against Barre, but were motivated by competition for resources, greed and localised power. Their most important channel for political ‘legitimacy’ was the externally supported peace talks, and later, critically, the US regional anti-terrorist strategy, headquartered in Djibouti.
The new warlord class included Muse Sudi Yalahow, Muhammad Qanyare Afrah and Osman Hassan Ali ‘Atto’, Muhammad Dhere, among others. Muse Sudi was a former junior government functionary, who became a powerful and feared Mogadishu-based faction leader by mobilising his Abgal sub-group. He did not participate in the Arta peace conference in Djibouti, and created external alliances as well as backing local factions. Qanyare is a former policeman, a founder of USC, who benefited from access to neighbouring Kenya – until East African states agreed to isolate the faction leaders by imposing a regional travel ban and freezing their assets.
Counter-terrorism
The US established the Djibouti base in 2003, with smaller bases or points of contact in the region [including Jijiga and Kebre Dahre in Ethiopia, Manda Island in Kenya, and Bosasso in north-eastern Somalia]. The focus of the US strategy is an anti-terrorist one, although they are also establishing programmes to dig wells and assist in humanitarian projects.
Reports in the US media claimed part of the anti-terrorist strategy in the region was to support the warlords and encourage them to seize individuals suspected of terrorism or Islamic extremism. This has always been officially denied by the US government. It became an ‘open secret’, with reports of money being dispersed from Nairobi by US intelligence agencies. In Mogadishu, the US was perceived to be behind the ‘anti-terrorist’ coalition set up by the warlords on 18 February, 2006, called the Alliance for Peace and Anti-Terrorism. Local reports – although unsubstantiated – claim that Qanyare, Dhere and Bashir Rage (a founding member of the alliance) have from time to time kidnapped ‘suspects’ in Mogadishu and handed them over to US agents.
Ultimately, the perceived role of the US provided a popular focus for resentment and served to strengthen the Islamic Court’s position.
How was victory achieved?
Key to the military success of the UIC was the fact that it was already an established and accepted presence in local communities, with a demonstrated social welfare policy. Apart from bringing security to areas under its control, through its own militia and justice system, it had also set up farms, schools, water points, health clinics and orphanages. Some key businessmen in Mogadishu worked with the Courts. Although the UIC did not initially have strong popular support – some were suspicious of its agenda – there was a feeling that it upheld moral standards and discipline and had a uniting and familiar ideology in Islam. This ensured the UIC received popular backing during the battle for Mogadishu.
People were also tired of the warlords as “there was no vision associated with that particular group”, explains civil society activist in Mogadishu, Abdullahi Shirwa. The warlord group had split from the TFG and had no opportunity to attain positions of power via that avenue. But the main turning-point was the announcement of the ‘counter-terrorist’ alliance, which was seen as an alien construct and a common enemy; it threatened a new lease of life for the warlords. The creation of the alliance unleashed a new sense of nationalism coupled with religious fervour, which in turn contributed to the widespread support for the Courts.
The UIC used disciplined units of fighters in the Mogadishu attack, in marked contrast to the warlords, whose militia behaved chaotically, firing indiscriminately, and depended heavily on supplies of qat. “The Courts brought a new style of fighting to Mogadishu. It was military,” said a Mogadishu resident. The attacks were organised by experienced military men, who replaced fighting units on front-lines. Manpower was reportedly drawn from different regions, including north-east and west Somalia, Juba Valley and the Somali region of Ethiopia, Kismayo and Gedo. The Courts also attacked at night, waiting until early morning when the militia were most vulnerable.
Structuring victory
After the Mogadishu takeover, structures set up by the UIC were based on the existing organisation of the Courts. The original aim was to bring together clans and sub-clans in an area to establish an Islamic court to provide a forum for justice and the handling of disputes. This was critical in trying to establish security in areas of Mogadishu where people were at the mercy of chaotic warlord rule. The Courts were comprised of three key people – the chairman of the Sharia courts; the commander of the Sharia court militia; and the chairman of the local Shura. The chairman of the UIC, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, formed an Islamic court to deal with crime and banditry in the SiSi area of north Mogadishu while working as a school teacher there in 2003. One of his students was kidnapped by militiamen; in trying to get the boy released the idea of a court was mooted. The community got together and set up the court and elected him chairman.
Structure
The challenge in the post-victory era is to extend and broaden the organisation without being weakened by inter-clan politics or being seen to impose the kind of central authority so distrusted by Somalis. This expectation contrasts sharply with the keenness of Somali professional classes and the international community to identify a ‘type’ of government as defined by centralised administrative structures and a definitive political ideology.
The Islamic Supreme Consultation Council of Islamic Courts has 91 members, and acts like a parliament for all the courts. It is headed by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys – whom the US government regards as a religious hardliner with connections to terrorist organisations. Since June, it has expanded to include representatives of all the established courts. It has no executive powers, but according to one observer, “sorts out any problems in outlying courts, keeps all the programmes in line, and makes sure everyone is reading from the same script”. Known as the Shura (council), it acts as an advisory body of the Islamic group.
The UIC has also established a 15-member executive council, headed by Sheikh Sharif, which acts as an executive branch of government and implements decisions. This makes Sheikh Sharif the de facto head of state.
Military
In Mogadishu, the UIC has concentrated on dismantling the notorious road-blocks, thereby effectively demobilising the clan-based militia and neutralising the warlords and local faction leaders, and denying them much-needed resources for the militia. Critically, it allows the population freedom of movement, and removes the daily threat of intimidation and extortion. It also removes the threat of spontaneous conflict from the ‘freelance’ militia, who live off what they can demand or steal. Many are addicted to drugs and qat and attack indiscriminately.
Sheikh Abdulakdir Ali, UIC vice-chairman, told IRIN that after the takeover the UIC had given priority to areas of high insecurity, particularly the main Bakara market and other business centres. Civilians, such as Halima Ali, a small trader, said people were taking full advantage of the new freedom of movement: “In the past I was robbed a number of times as I went to the market; [now] I go and come back with everything.”
After taking Mogadishu, the focus of military operations immediately shifted to Jowhar, 90kms north of the capital. Jowhar was the former base of the TFG and the seat of Muhammad Dhere. The TFG had evacuated its temporary seat before the fight for Mogadishu. The UIC said hostile militia and “technicals” [heavy weapons mounted on trucks] were being mobilised in Jowhar. A group of warlords led by Muhammad Qanyare fled to Jowhar after their defeat in Mogadishu on 4 June. There were reports the group was trying to reorganise there. In a pre-emptive strike, the UIC attacked the town and took it without much resistance on 14 June. Qanyare and his group had fled the town the night before.
Belet Wein, Adado, Dusa Mereb and Merka, in central and southern Somalia, all have locally inspired Courts that are connected to the UIC through the Supreme Consultative Council, and are therefore considered to be under its control.
It has rejected the TFG call for foreign troops. The UIC opposes the deployment of foreign troops on the grounds that it would make the country more dangerous and unstable, adding that they were already providing security in the capital. However, the African Union announced on Monday 19 June that it would propose sending a peacekeeping mission to Somalia and that it would be sending an assessment team to evaluate the situation on the ground. “We agreed that priority be given to dialogue, and [this] should take place with the transitional federal institutions and all the parties in Somalia,” AU Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit said in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.
Since taking Mogadishu, the UIC has accused Ethiopia of sending troops across the border into Somalia, a claim denied by the Ethiopian government. “Ethiopia has absolutely nothing to do with the latest fighting in Mogadishu and other towns between the militia of the warlords and the Islamic Courts Union,” said a statement from the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry.
Diplomatic
The international response to the UIC takeover has so far been characterized by fear of extremism. Little is known about the ideology or ambition of the UIC but it has been placed firmly centre-stage in the post-9/11 ‘new world order’, with the US officially accusing it of being associated with terrorists, and Osama bin Laden warning the international community not to send foreign troops to Somalia.
The official US government line is that the head of the Supreme Council, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, has links with terrorist organisations and will not hold talks with him. Aweys appeared on a list of ‘suspects’ whose assets were frozen post-9/11.
On 29 June, a senior US official, Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Fraser, said Aweys was on a US terrorist watch-list as a suspected collaborator with al-Qaida. She told a joint hearing on international terrorism that the US was concerned about Somalia becoming a base for terrorists, and that the Union of Islamic Courts had “elements in it that are jihadist in nature, militant hardliners, and indeed are providing a haven for terrorists in Mogadishu and within Somalia”.
The UIC must also form a policy regarding the TFG, which is supported by western donors and the international community as a government-in-waiting. Sheikh Sharif has said that although the TFG has failed to save the country and was established outside Somalia, “we are talking to them out of respect for the international community”.
Representatives from the UIC and the TFG met in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, on 22 June, and agreed to mutually recognise each other and engage in further dialogue. Both parties also agreed to end “all harmful propaganda” against each other, and to meet again for more substantive talks.
UN Special Representative Fall told IRIN that the UN had “encouraged the parties to talk and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan welcomed the outcome of the meeting”.
Outside Mogadishu
The UIC is extending its influence and building on a network of representatives and contacts that it has established in various areas of the country over the past two or three years.
In some areas, such as Afmadow, Juba Valley, the UIC has been engaged in dialogue with the elders for some time. It had proposed that the UIC take over the administration from the elders and a court system be established. The elders welcomed representatives of the UIC but refused to hand over the administration of the town. One of the key players in the UIC, Hassan Turk – formerly based in Ras Komboni on the coast – passed through Juba valley in March with technicals and militia, on the way to Mogadishu. He requested the elders to provide him with military and technical support, but received a lukewarm response.
Similarly, in Mererey, southern Somalia, the UIC has no authority, but has established sufficient influence on which it can build. Last year, the UIC bought agricultural land and a banana plantation in Mererey. By virtue of its legitimate purchase – in contrast to the looting of faction leaders – and by providing employment to local farm workers, the UIC gained local respect and acceptance.
In the wake of the Mogadishu victory, such contacts in the towns and districts are likely to be utilised to extend influence. The shift of power now means elders are more likely to accept the courts, without any military action necessary.
In Jowhar, captured by the UIC on 14 June, there has been a marked change. Journalist Muhammad Ibrahim Malimow told IRIN there was “a sense of relief” that the Courts had taken over, as people were no longer under duress to pay the exorbitant taxes that warlord Muhammad Dhere used to impose. Food prices have fallen by between 15 and 20 percent since the takeover. Elders, intellectuals, religious leaders and business people are now directly involved in decision-making, and there is a resurgence of debate and discussion over issues of leadership.
On the downside, the Courts failed to put in place an effective administration in Jowhar, says Malimow. Crime and insecurity have disappeared in the town since the takeover, but “if two people have a dispute, there is no place so far to take it”.
Conclusion
The UIC faces major challenges, both locally and diplomatically. “In order to capitalise on its victory in Mogadishu it must extend its administrative and political structures without weakening its authority, or falling prey to divisive clan politics,” says an influential businessman in Mogadishu.
Military discipline among the militia is vital but difficult to achieve when a generation of young men has depended on extortion and brutality, which for many became an established means of livelihood. The UIC had previously achieved a reputation for discipline and control by virtue of its intolerance of ‘qat’ and drugs; but no Somali government has succeeded in banning qat, an established economic and social habit. Similarly, the UIC has made clear its intention to ‘clean up’ local video houses, in terms of drugs, alcohol and criminality – but no uniformity of policy is evident on what programmes are the target. However, they indicated that for the time being they have other priorities.
“The UIC has to move from the euphoria of victory to the actual task of governing,” said one observer. After savouring the relief of security and freedom of movement, people have started to expect services and the benefits of authority and leadership. While it has managed to remove the hated warlord ‘taxation’ systems, the UIC is faced with the challenge of finding sufficient funding to govern and rehabilitate areas under its control. Setting up even the most basic administrative structures means broadening its circle to include individuals with managerial and governance skills.
On the diplomatic front, opposition from the US, Ethiopia and other countries in the region has already defined its image abroad to a large extent. One of the biggest challenges for the UIC is to work out a policy that allows it to deal pragmatically with the TFG – which it perceives as a political extension of the warlord class – without further alienating the international community.
According to Fall, in his conversation with chairman Sheikh Sharif, the UN Special Representative stressed the need to respect the ceasefire and to maintain a dialogue. He said the chairman had expressed his willingness to work with all parties interested in promoting peace in Somalia.
“Dialogue is part of the culture of the Somali people. I am hopeful that whatever differences exist among the Somalis today can be resolved peacefully. The UN stands ready to assist the peace process in any way possible,” he said.
ah/lh/mw/eo
[ENDS]
Source: IRIN, July 6, 2006
