The Quest for Statehood in Somalia
Now in some parts of the South some kind of sensible popular uprising have started, it seems that the time is once again ripe for those who have a genuine interest in the plight of the Somali people to engage in a meaningful debate on explaining and supporting where they can this new development.
In the attempts to understand the complex mosaic of Somali socio-political puzzle two broad visions can be distinguished. There are those who view the Somali failed state and the subsequent socio-political turmoil in the light of what is happening elsewhere in Africa. They define the Somali problem in relative terms and see these problems as part and parcel of a wider African crisis. This group of observers runs the risk of being accused to be too utopian in their quest for explanations from a broader perspective, namely, post-colonial African politics. Others, perhaps the majority, see problems in their respective parts of the country in isolation from what is happening elsewhere in the country or in Africa. Those who define Somali problems in regional terms regard themselves as the only victims of what went wrong in the country. This latter view is susceptible to being hijacked by narrow minded people who do not contextualize fairly the Somali problem and fail to see that the failed state in Somalia created more victims in different localities throughout the country. On the contrary it is thanks to their efforts that localized peace has been established in many certain parts of the country.
Each of the two views has its weaknesses but also its strengths. Nevertheless, neither approach in its pure form can provide us with sufficient analytical tool for comprehensive understanding of the political puzzle in the country. Hence we need a balanced view on the events and processes in Somalia. Relating them to the latest developments in Somalia, namely the popular uprising headed by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), I argue that these two distinct views need not necessarily be antagonistic but that they are compatible with one another.
Somalia’s failed state had many victims
Although it is fair to localize analyzing bottle necks to state formation in Somalia, it should not happen at the expense of contextualizing the failed statehood in the country in the broader and relevant African context. A Dutch journalist covering democratization processes in Africa once related to me that Somalia’s civil war and failed state can be regarded as a temporary interruption of the state formation process which started in the late 40s when many African nations were aspiring for statehood. Although I endorsed his observation and thought that his view can be instrumental if one wishes to make sense of what is going on in that part of the world, I nevertheless struggled with the practical question of giving localized dimension to the suffering of people in certain parts of the country. It seemed to me that the different Somali communities are simply but also surprisingly fifteen years after the collapse of the previous regime still not ready to understand or recognize each other’s suffering. This is where reconciliation among the Somalis goes miss – a reconciliation that booked success in South Africa and Rwanda, where the scale of suffering of innocent people cannot be claimed to be less than that of Somalia if not bigger. However, the question is how can much the needed and important processes of nation building or reconciliation, be better managed? This is where, depending on their geographical affiliation, people’s view differ. Perhaps justifiably so. In my view these remain legitimate issues that need serious debating and consideration.
Such healthy debating can be based on the two approaches which the Somalis employ in their quest for statehood. One is the bottom-up, the other top-down. The bottom-up is first initiated in Somaliland where local politics is intermingled with indigenous tribal traditions. Advantage of this approach is that it appeals to the wider public and that it is feasible and manageable by traditional or lay people without sophisticated politburo in place. The argument goes that if similar processes can be repeated throughout the whole country as has happened in Puntland, it might lead to a situation which is conducive to efforts aimed at establishing a higher order structure. Unfortunately the formula, which was often rightly propagated by the late Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (Rahimahullah), did not take root in the South. At least until recently, if it is so viewed, when the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) succeeded to return law and order in Mogadishu. Such initiatives in the South need to be welcomed at least in the light of indigenization of political processes.
A Case for the Unity of Islamic Courts to Consider
If the UIC do not subside under the weight of their quick and unpredicted success and consolidate their efforts in Mogadishu and its immediate regions, they are likely to be powerful stakeholders in the local politics of the country. However, should the UIC seek hegemony and claim legitimacy in areas where similar Islamic courts are established as far away as Galkaayo or Las Anod, it will mean their ultimate demise. The first obstacle for the UIC to win is to overcome the international prejudice against faith based political initiatives. Unfortunately at this crucial early stage it seems that the UIC is failing to win sympathy from the international community. This is UIC needs advice and guidance with. Whereas in the case of Somaliland people found their common denominator in shared colonial history and Puntland tribal affiliations, the UIC found it in the application of the Sharia. There is nothing wrong with such approach as long as it unites the people of Mogadishu and so long as peace making in Mogadishu remains a main target. Somalilanders or Puntlanders and the Somali Diaspora should not shy away from being sympathetic to this popular local initiative which if properly managed could be bring Somalis a step closer to more general but decisive phase where the way forward can then be discussed.
Recycled visionless politicians
The second approach is the top-down model which enjoys the blessing of the international community. The 15 or so efforts some with perennial conferences in an off-site laboratory like venues in neighbouring countries has had no practical relevance for the search of a meaningful solution applicable to the Somali situation. It can be argued that the fundamental reasons of their failure is perhaps due to the absence of Somaliland, the presence of a large number of recycled corrupted, visionless and power hungry politicians. It is quite paradoxical to see Baidabo day-dreamers putting the final touch on a draft structure of a paper government whilst the UIC are claiming more ground.
Guurti and Mullah efforts necessary but not sufficient to build a viable state
In conclusion, Somalis have seen enough of in-vitro fertilized transitional governments which are tube tested in neighbouring countries. Having discussed the situation in situ, there is a great need to relate local events to the wider regional context and better understand the competing interest of the regional governments in the question of Somali statehood. Local initiatives are therefore necessary step towards finding a more permanent solution but not sufficient answer to the political ailments Somalis face. Furthermore, it needs to be recognized that on the longer term the Guurti or Mullah Style administrations have their limitations. They can simply not run the complex modern state machinery to its fullest potential. In Somalia, like many African countries, the political elites who pioneered the struggle for independence in the 1960s turned into visionless political monsters thirty years on when in the 1990s a host of civil wars broke out in many parts of Africa. In the aftermath of the failed African states, the statesman turned warlord and self-styled warlords became all too common. It is unfortunate as in the case of Somaliland or the successive interim governments for Somalia to observe the presence of large number of recycled visionless politicians who were relegated from the previous collapsed system. In that sense it might be stated that not much has changed in terms of fresh ideas and strategic visions to pull out the Somali people out of the morass. In theory though it is still plausible that we see in our lifetime a flourishing Somaliland, thriving Puntland, prosperous Mogadishu and Riverineland and perhaps ultimately the old Somalia which attracts investment from estranged Somalis who are pouring their hard won pounds elsewhere in the region.
Mohamed Obsiye
Human Geographer and Social Worker
London
mobsiye78@hotmail.com
